Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing
Moran, James, State v. (2005)
Court:
Wisconsin Supreme Court
Counsel:
Wisconsin Innocence Project
Case Number:
03-0561-CR
Position: State postconviction DNA statutes, which mandate DNA testing if the testing might create a "reasonable probability" of a different outcome, do not create "outcome determinative test" (in which defendant must prove that a different result is more likely than not), but rather an "undermines confidence" test, as understood in Strickland and Brady. The standard of review on appeal of a trial court's denial of a DNA motion should be de novo.
Williams, Archie, State of Louisiana v. (2007)
Court:
Missouri Supreme Court
Counsel:
Public Interest Litigation Clinic (Kansas City), Center on Wrongful Convictions, Innocence Project
Case Number:
85448 and 85552
Position: NOTE: Brief not filed because relief granted. Postconviction DNA testing statutes permit DNA testing in cases in which the defendant pled guilty or confessed.
Phillips, State v. (2006)
Counsel:
Innocence Project, Inc., the Texas Center for Actual Innocence, the Innocence Project of Texas, and the Texas Innocence Network
Position: Urging court to reject narrow interpretation of Texas' postconviction DNA testing statute. Urges court to recognize that the "would not have been convicted" standard is met, even if an exclusion of defendant alone would not conclusively prove Innocence, where alternate sources of the DNA (e.g., the victim's husband) can be excluded by other testing, or where a database hit might prove Innocence. Also urges court to interpret the statute's "identity at issue" requirement so as not to exclude individuals who claim to have not participated in the crime.
Young, John K. v. Commonwealth (2005)
Counsel:
Innocence Project
Case Number:
324-EAL-2005
Position: Postconviction DNA testing statutes permit DNA testing in cases in which the defendant pled guilty or confessed.
Savory, Johnnie Lee v. Lyons (2007)
Court:
U.S. Supreme Court
Counsel:
Innocence Network (by Mayer Brown)
Position: The statute of limitations should not bar claims for claims for postconviction DNA testing under ?Ǭ�1983, because such rights do not accrue until access to DNA is denied, equitable tolling applies, and every refusal to allow access to DNA is a continuing violation.
Alley, Sedley v. State (2006)
Court:
Tennessee Supreme Court
Counsel:
Innocence Network (by Wisconsin Innocence Project)
Case Number:
W2006-001179-CCA-R3-PD
Position: Prisoners have a right to postconviction DNA testing, regardless of perceived "strength" of state's case, where the DNA might help establish innocence not just by an exclusion of defendant, but also by a match to a third-party or by redundant crime scene DNA profiles that all exclude defendant. -Rules barring or limiting third-party perpetrator evidence should be abolished; such evidence should be considered on an equal footing as any other type of evidence, which is evaluated by considering relevance and the risk of undue prejudice, and not some heightened relevance or presumed prejudice standard. Third-party perpetrator evidence cannot be excluded simply because the state or a court views the state's evidence as "overwhelming."
Floyd, John v. Cain (2010) (2010)
Court:
Louisiana Court of Appeals
Counsel:
Innocence Network by James E. Boren and Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP
Case Number:
2010-KP-0085
Position: Post-conviction petitioners, who can establish their actual innocence through newly-discovered evidence of any type, are entitled to seek relief.
Smith, Frederick J., In Re (2008)
Counsel:
Innocence Network, Innocence Project (by Wilmer Culter Pickering Hale and Dorr)
Case Number:
07-1220
Position: Arguing that ?Ǭ�1983 actions for post-conviction DNA testing are not barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
